下記ニュースについて
スティーブン・ボズワース氏(写真)は、クリストファー・ヒル氏と同等以上の対北宥和派というのが私の印象だ。昨年5月、米誌『ニューズウィーク』に載った同氏のコラム(共著)も貼り付けておく。
特に問題なのは、同氏が、アメリカはじめ関係諸国(当然日本も含む)は、北朝鮮の「人権抑圧継続を認め」(とはっきり言っている)、すべての制裁を解除してエネルギー支援や対北投資を実施すべきだと主張している点である。そうして北を地域さらには世界経済の網の目に組み入れていけば、北もゆくゆくは核放棄を受け入れるだろうというのである。
もちろん同氏は、米朝国交正常化を行うべきだという立場だ。
日本で言えば、民主党の川上義博参院議員、社民党、共産党あたりとは、よく意見が合うことだろう。
イザ!ニュース
米の北担当特使にボスワース元駐韓大使 6カ国協議の米首席代表に
2009/02/12 09:46更新
【ワシントン=有元隆志】ロイター通信は11日、北朝鮮の核問題などを担当する特使にボスワース元駐韓大使が起用されると伝えた。北朝鮮の核問題をめぐる6カ国協議の米首席代表を務めることになる。
ボスワース氏はこのほど米国の外交・安全保障の専門家らと訪朝し、北朝鮮側と意見交換した。ボスワース氏は北京に戻った際、長距離弾道ミサイル「テポドン2号」の発射準備について「(北朝鮮側は)肯定も否定もしなかった」と説明した。
ボスワース氏はチュニジア、フィリピンで大使を務めた後、朝鮮半島エネルギー開発機構(KEDO)の事務局長となった。その後、1997年から2001年まで駐韓大使を務めた。
ブッシュ前政権下ではヒル国務次官補(東アジア・太平洋担当)が首席代表を兼ねていたが、「北朝鮮担当大使」と呼ばれるほど核問題への交渉に専念した結果、日本や中国などとの2国間関係への取り組みが足りなかったと批判を浴びた。このため専任の特使を置くべきとの声が出ていた。
オバマ政権ではミッチェル元民主党上院院内総務が中東特使に、ホルブルック元国連大使がアフガニスタン・パキスタン担当特別代表に起用されている。
NEWSWEEK
From the magazine issue dated May 12, 2008
http://www.newsweek.com/id/135290
Reaching Out To Pyongyang
Despite its achievements, Washington is divided on how to deal with North Korea long term.
Morton Abramowitz and Stephen Bosworth
A battle rages in Washington, uniting forces of left and right against a divided Bush administration over whether to compel North Korea to tell the detailed truth about its nuclear-weapons capabilities and its Syrian connection, or to allow the country to collapse as a pariah state.
But our recent trip to the North Korean capital suggests that the current controversy conceals more fundamental issues in U.S. relations with North Korea: unlike the United States, Pyongyang has both a short- and long-term policy toward its antagonist. It is willing to bargain away its nuclear-weapons programs piece by piece starting now, but only in return for a new, nonhostile relationship with Washington and more help for its economy.
Washington, by contrast, has focused solely on the issue of denuclearization (and even on that Washington remains divided) and has no broader approach to North Korea. It falls to the next administration, one hopes, to devise a strategy toward Pyongyang that addresses both the nuclear program and the long-term question of how to deal with the weak but dangerous nation.
This is not to deny the recent achievements, only to put them in context. After six years of ideological posturing, the Bush administration followed the Clinton administration in trading goodies to halt North Korea's illicit weapons programs. Under a multistage agreement reached in February 2007 in the Six-Party Talks, North Korea has stopped producing plutonium at Yongbyon and the facility is finally being disabled. Once the process is completed later this year, North Korea will no longer be able to quickly regain its plutonium-production capability.
North Korea has also recently provided the West an inventory of its nuclear programs that, while not publicly divulged, is believed to include information on its plutonium stockpiles and maybe its weapons as well. U.S. and North Korean negotiators have also reportedly agreed on formulas—causing all the controversy—for handling North Korea's alleged nuclear dealings with Syria and its alleged uranium-enrichment program.
In exchange, the Bush administration has promised to remove North Korea from its list of terrorist sponsors and to end some trade sanctions. If the current phase can be completed, the next phase of negotiations is expected to cover the dismantling of the reactor and the verification of Pyongyang's plutonium holdings. The recent flap in Washington over the extent of North Korea's aid to Syria should not obstruct the critical task: capping Pyongyang's production of plutonium and getting North Korea to give up its stockpile of plutonium and weapons.
Ensuring that North Korea does not continue to produce plutonium is critical. But it will not be easy to persuade Pyongyang to give up the fissile material it has already produced. Officials in Pyongyang made it clear to us that complete denuclearization—a North Korean agreement to give up all nuclear weapons and plutonium stocks—is not in the near future. That's because, from the North's perspective, the negotiations with Washington are about far more than just nuclear weapons. Pyongyang sees its arsenal as a means to an end, not an end in itself—something U.S. leaders never understand.
What North Korea wants more than anything is "political compensation," a relationship with Washington, in which the United States would stop making threats, drop all sanctions and start treating North Korea as a friendly country. As Pyongyang sees it, such moves would finally allow it to join the global economic community—key to its survival. Until then, North Korea will hold on to its nuclear weapons as an insurance policy against a U.S. attack and, more important, the threat that Washington will simply ignore North Korea and allow it to starve in the dark.
What this means in practical terms is that Pyongyang won't give up its nukes until it's sure Washington has permanently abandoned its "hostile policies," and "mutual trust" has been established. This will require, among other things, establishing diplomatic relations and striking a peace agreement that formally ends the Korean War.
The next U.S. president will have to decide how to deal with North Korea in a larger sense, not just on the nuclear question. We think the best approach would be to forge ahead with the denuclearization process while also working with the other members of the Six-Party Process to begin to build a web of connections tying North Korea to the regional and global economies.
This would likely involve some economic subsidies for North Korea, including more humanitarian aid, energy assistance and investment in the rebuilding of the economy. Such a deal, which would permit North Korea to continue its internal repressive policies, would be no easy sell politically in the United States.
But it would, at a minimum, reduce the threat of further proliferation and improve the chances of getting North Korea to give up its plutonium and weapons. There are no guarantees, but this approach would be far better than waiting around and hoping North Korea will collapse. That is no real policy at all, and rest assured North Korea knows how to get our attention.
Abramowitz, a senior fellow at The Century Foundation, is a former assistant secretary of State. Bosworth, dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, is a former ambassador to South Korea.