ライス氏は、「完全な核申告」をいつの間にか勝手に、どれだけのプルトニウムが作られたのか（生産量）と「そのプルトニウムに何が起こったのか」（what has happened to it―核爆弾の数や製造工場の詳細等が含まれよう）に分け、前者のみをもって「完全な申告」と見なすがごとき後退姿勢を見せている。
核爆弾問題は先送り 核計画の申告で ライス国務長官
Interview with Steve Hayes of the Weekly Standard
Secretary Condoleezza Rice
May 9, 2008
SECRETARY RICE: The third element is the plutonium program, and there we also know a lot, but we don't know enough about how much plutonium was made, and what has happened to it. And that is a dangerous circumstance because that is material that is already made.
SECRETARY RICE: Now it is my hope that we can shut – that we can put North Korea – shut down their plutonium program, put them hopefully out of the business. We first got them to shut down the reactor. With all due respect to those who think we've done the Agreed Framework, again, that's all the Agreed Framework ever did was get them to shut down the reactor. We've gotten them to disable the reactor. And there are further steps to disable the reactor and associated facilities.
SECRETARY RICE: We're working now on trying to get to know what they made. And that is a – that's something you can actually verify, because with documentation plus access, you can actually do the forensics and you can actually verify. And that was my conversation with Patty McNerney and Paula DeSutter two days ago.
MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah.
SECRETARY RICE: And we had it with Sung Kim, who was going out to North Korea, and said, here's what you have to be able to deliver on verification. And there's an interagency working group. DOE is a part of that. So anyway, we're doing that piece. Now I also would like to see, you know, if we can then get the next phase would be to know what happened to it and there is a hope to – you know, to really have them denuclearize, which really means that the stuff comes out of the country in one way or another. But that's another step down the road.
Now in exchange for each of these steps, we have – you know, there's some fuel oil that's going -- gone to them. By the way, for ten years, we gave them fuel oil under the Agreed Framework and never got them to do more than temporarily shut – you know, freeze the production. So do I think the fuel oil is worth it? Yes, as we move through these steps. And we've not made a determination on whether or not we are – where we need to be on the declaration and verification mechanisms to go through with other steps. We'll have to make a determination about the terrorism list and issues like that.
QUESTION: Would it be possible for them to get off the terrorist list without acknowledging what they were doing in Syria as a very basic first step?
SECRETARY RICE: What we're doing is we want to look at – take a look at the totality of the nuclear – what we know about their nuclear program and the nuclear declaration. And the – at some point, we will make public these documents.
SECRETARY RICE: Because I think there's some – also some misunderstandings about what's in these agreed minutes about – and the agreed minutes are only until – they're only agreed, in fact, after we've agreed about the whole --
SECRETARY RICE: -- nuclear declaration. So, I'm not going to make any judgments until we are – until we know where we are on these issues.
QUESTION: But you could see a scenario, after looking at the totality of this, where they don't acknowledge having proliferated and they are taken off the terrorist list?
QUESTION: To send them a message that this is intolerable, there are certain lines that you can't cross and you've crossed one?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: First of all, the reactor's not there anymore. So whatever benefits of cooperation there were, it isn't there anymore.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Secondly, yes, we could blow up the talks and we could put the United States back in a position of having no cooperation from China or the Koreans on what one does to deal with North Korean behavior. And we could be in a situation in which we can't do anything about their plutonium program. Yes, we could do that.
SECRETARY RICE: ……Secondly, we have used pressure. We – you know, we did the designation of their financial institution. We've used the UN Security Council resolutions and they, by the way, are still operating under 1718. Nobody has suggested that we try to remove – even the North Koreans that we try to remove that Security Council resolution. And we have put some incentives – by the way, small incentives.
One thing that's not even understood, for instance, about the Trading with the Enemy Act and the terrorism designation is – and I don't want to – I'm not saying we will do them, but even if you did do them, the list of continuing sanctions on the North Koreans takes up several pages. So this is not a policy – I think you've heard me say that I don't see diplomacy as being the soft side of foreign policy. Diplomacy has to take advantage of the hard assets that you have in order to make it work, particularly when you're dealing with a regime like the North Koreans.
Released on May 27, 2008