ライスが落ちた陥穽 |
下記ニュースについて
産経・有元記者が取り上げた米誌『ウィークリー・スタンダード』によるライス米国務長官インタビュー(国務省ウェブサイト掲載版)から、該当箇所を産経の記事に続いて引いておく。複数の「国務省高官」も同席、補足発言をしている。
北朝鮮が、合意に反してシリアへの核拡散を行っていた点については、「高官」が、イスラエルの爆撃によって核施設が破壊されたのだからもうよいではないか、事を荒立てて肝心のプルトニウム問題が暗礁に乗り上げてもよいのか、と事実上不問に付す意向を示している。
これは、弱腰を批判された際、国務省がよく見せる無原則な開き直りで、北が、合意違反してもペナルティを課せられることはないと高をくくるもとになっている。
ライス氏は、「完全な核申告」をいつの間にか勝手に、どれだけのプルトニウムが作られたのか(生産量)と「そのプルトニウムに何が起こったのか」(what has happened to it―核爆弾の数や製造工場の詳細等が含まれよう)に分け、前者のみをもって「完全な申告」と見なすがごとき後退姿勢を見せている。
他の国はどうあれ、日本はこうした欺瞞的「再定義」をはっきり斥けねばならない。受け入れるなら、「対米追随」のそしりは免れまい。
ライス氏はさらに、仮にテロ国家指定を解除しても、まだ何ページにも及ぶ制裁措置が残っている、指定解除は「小さな飴」(small incentives)に過ぎないと強弁している。
ごまかしがごまかしを呼ぶ悪循環であり、北と未来に向けた交渉が可能という幻想に囚われた者が常に落ちる陥穽に見事にはまったようだ。
イザ!ニュース
核爆弾問題は先送り 核計画の申告で ライス国務長官
05/28 17:37更新
【ワシントン=有元隆志】ライス米国務長官は米誌のインタビューで、北朝鮮が近く行う予定の核計画の申告に核爆弾の保有数などは今回含まれず、「次の段階の措置」で扱う見通しを示した。米政府はすべての核計画を「完全かつ正確」に申告するよう求めてきたが、北朝鮮が核爆弾の保有数や製造工場などを含めることを拒否し続けてきたため、事実上先送りを容認した格好だ。
国務省が27日、公表した米誌ウイークリー・スタンダードとのインタビュー内容によると、ライス長官は「いまわれわれは彼らが何を製造したか知ろうと努めている。次の段階では(製造されたプルトニウムで)何が起きたかを知ることになる」と語った。
核爆弾については、5月19日にワシントンで開かれた6カ国協議の日米韓3カ国首席代表による会合でも、核の脅威を直接受ける日韓から所在把握の重要性が提起された。ただ、核問題をめぐる6カ国協議の米首席代表、ヒル国務次官補(東アジア・太平洋担当)は、日本人拉致被害者「家族会」らと2日に面会した際、北朝鮮との交渉で核爆弾製造工場の位置に関する説明を受けていないことを認め、「それが問題点だ」と述べていた。
ライス長官はインタビューで、「北朝鮮が信じるに足る体制と思っている人は誰もいない」とし、申告内容の検証が必要との認識を強調。対応を見極め「(北朝鮮への)テロ支援国家指定などに関して決定することになる」とした。日本人拉致事件など人権問題の進展には言及しなかった。
長官はテロ支援国家指定解除や対敵通商法の適用終了などを受け入れたとしても「他に多くの制裁が残っている」と述べ、北朝鮮の要求を受け入れすぎるとの批判に反論した。
Interview with Steve Hayes of the Weekly Standard
Secretary Condoleezza Rice
May 9, 2008
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2008/05/105203.htm
……
SECRETARY RICE: The third element is the plutonium program, and there we also know a lot, but we don't know enough about how much plutonium was made, and what has happened to it. And that is a dangerous circumstance because that is material that is already made.
QUESTION: Yeah.
SECRETARY RICE: Now it is my hope that we can shut – that we can put
QUESTION: Right.
SECRETARY RICE: We're working now on trying to get to know what they made. And that is a – that's something you can actually verify, because with documentation plus access, you can actually do the forensics and you can actually verify. And that was my conversation with Patty McNerney and Paula DeSutter two days ago.
MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah.
SECRETARY RICE: And we had it with Sung Kim, who was going out to
Now in exchange for each of these steps, we have – you know, there's some fuel oil that's going -- gone to them. By the way, for ten years, we gave them fuel oil under the Agreed Framework and never got them to do more than temporarily shut – you know, freeze the production. So do I think the fuel oil is worth it? Yes, as we move through these steps. And we've not made a determination on whether or not we are – where we need to be on the declaration and verification mechanisms to go through with other steps. We'll have to make a determination about the terrorism list and issues like that.
QUESTION: Would it be possible for them to get off the terrorist list without acknowledging what they were doing in
SECRETARY RICE: What we're doing is we want to look at – take a look at the totality of the nuclear – what we know about their nuclear program and the nuclear declaration. And the – at some point, we will make public these documents.
QUESTION: Right.
SECRETARY RICE: Because I think there's some – also some misunderstandings about what's in these agreed minutes about – and the agreed minutes are only until – they're only agreed, in fact, after we've agreed about the whole --
QUESTION: Right.
SECRETARY RICE: -- nuclear declaration. So, I'm not going to make any judgments until we are – until we know where we are on these issues.
QUESTION: But you could see a scenario, after looking at the totality of this, where they don't acknowledge having proliferated and they are taken off the terrorist list?
QUESTION: To send them a message that this is intolerable, there are certain lines that you can't cross and you've crossed one?
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: First of all, the reactor's not there anymore. So whatever benefits of cooperation there were, it isn't there anymore.
QUESTION: Right.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Secondly, yes, we could blow up the talks and we could put the United States back in a position of having no cooperation from China or the Koreans on what one does to deal with North Korean behavior. And we could be in a situation in which we can't do anything about their plutonium program. Yes, we could do that.
……
SECRETARY RICE: ……Secondly, we have used pressure. We – you know, we did the designation of their financial institution. We've used the UN Security Council resolutions and they, by the way, are still operating under 1718. Nobody has suggested that we try to remove – even the North Koreans that we try to remove that Security Council resolution. And we have put some incentives – by the way, small incentives.
One thing that's not even understood, for instance, about the Trading with the Enemy Act and the terrorism designation is – and I don't want to – I'm not saying we will do them, but even if you did do them, the list of continuing sanctions on the North Koreans takes up several pages. So this is not a policy – I think you've heard me say that I don't see diplomacy as being the soft side of foreign policy. Diplomacy has to take advantage of the hard assets that you have in order to make it work, particularly when you're dealing with a regime like the North Koreans.
2008/424
Released on May 27, 2008